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capable of expelling the ball from the gun with great force, ailI so on ?
Generally, as to the negligence imputed to the defendant, it may
be said that the act was not to be affected by the circumstances
attending it, and therefore it was not to be decided by the jury.
If, under any circumstances, the storing of powder with other
goods in a warehouse in a city, would be a reasonable exercise of
judgment and discretion, the rule would be otherwise; because, if
the circumstances may give color to the act and make that fair and
unquestionable, which otherwise must appear to be culpable, the
jury would have to determine, whether by the circumstances the
act was relieved of the character ascribed to it. But such, it is
believed, cannot be the rule as to any such misconduct. There was
nothing in the evidence upon which the jury could say, that the
act of putting powder in the warehouse was not negligent, a
therefore, there was nothing to be deterumined by them on that
point, except the matter of putting it there, which was left to them
to decide on the evidence. Whether the presence of powder in
the warehouse was the direct and efficient cause of the loss, was
not, as it could not be, conclusively shown ; but the evidence on
that point is regarded as sufficient to sustain the verdict; that was
peculiarly a question for the jury: .Milwaukee Railway C-o. v.Eellogg, 4 Otto 474. We do not feel at liberty to disturb the verdict on that ground, and we have not been able to discover any.
error in any part of the record.
The motion is denied.
DILLON, Circuit J., concurred.
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ACTION.

Cause of Action determinabe by Declaration-Billof Particulars.-

The declaration in the writ is the criterion for determining what is
recovprable in an action. If the declaration is broad enough to cover
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a particular claim, it may be proved and recovered, though it was not
specified nor contemplated by the plaintiff when the writ was drawn:
Haley v. Hobson, 68 Me.
The filing of a bill of particulars, either upon the motion of the
plaintiff or the defendant, is not objectionable as introducing a new
cause of action, even though the plaintiff had no such cause in his
mind as the bill states when he commenced the action: Id.
ADMIRALTY.
Salvage-Services rendered in setting Salvors in Motion.-A steamtug, having a vessel in tow, saw a ship ashore and went out of her way
to inform, -and informed, another steam-tug of what she had seen. The
other steam-tug thereupon proceeded to the stranded ship and towed her
into safety. In an action of salvage instituted on behalf of both steamtugs against the ship, feld, that the owners, master, and crew of both
steam-tugs were entitled to salvage remuneration: The Sarah, Law
Rep. 3 Prob. Div.
Salvage-Contribution-Non-liabiltyof Shipownersfor .Life Salvage
in eases where no -Propertybelonging to them has been salved.-The C.,
a Spanish steamship, fell in at sea with the S., an English steamship,
with signals of distress flying and entirely helpless from injuries sustained
in a collision with a third vessel. The passengers of the S. and a quantity
of specie, which had formed part of the cargo of the S., having been
taken on board the C., attempts were made by the master and crew of
the C. to tow the S. into safety. These attempts were ineffectual, and
ultimately, after the master and ciew of the S. had gone on board the
C. the S. was abandoned, and her passengers, master and crew were
landed in safety at an English port. Afterwards the specie was arrested
in an action of salvage instituted at the suit of the owners, master, and
crew of the C., who claimed in the action to recover for life salvage and
for salvage services rendered to the S. and the specie. The owners 6f
the specie appeared as defendants, and served a notice on the owneis of
the S., calling upon them to contribute to the remuneration claimed by
the plaintiffs. Thereupon the owners of the S. appeared. At the hearing of the action the court awarded salvage remuneration to the plaintiffs for the services rendered, but reserved all questions as to the liabil.
ity of the owners of the S. The owners of the specie then moved the
court to declare that such portion of the sum awarded as was awarded
for life salvage ought to be recouped to the owners of the specie. The
court refused the motion on the ground that no property belonging 'to
the owners of the S. having been salved they could not be held personally liable to pay any portion of the sum awarded: The Cargo ex Sarpedon, Law Rep. 3 Prob. Div.
AGENT.

See Trover.

ASSUMPSIT.
Money had and received.-The defendant subscribed for shares in a
patent right, to be held by him without payment therefor, otherwise
than by inducing others to subscribe for shares and give their notes therefor for greatly more than the value of the shares; the notes afterwards
came into his hands by puichase, and were by him negotiated for money
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and paid by the makers. Held, that these facts would not entitle the
makers to maintain an action against him for money had and received:
Lane v. Smith, 68 Me.
BANK.

Failureof-Suspension of Specie Payments.-A suspension of specie
payments by a bank is a failure of such bank: Godfrey et al.v. erry,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
BANKRUPTCY.

Preference of Creditor under Bankrupt Act-Scienter necessary on
part of Credtor.-Underthe Bankrupt Act, it is not enough that a
creditor has some cause to suspect the insolvency of his debtor, but he
must have such a knowledge of facts as to induce a reasonable belief
of his debtor's insolvency, in order to invalidate a security taken for his
debt: Grant v. National Bank et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
BOND.

Requisites of-Tax Collector's Official Bond.-Generally the term
"bond" implies an instrument under seal : Ithabitants of Boothbay v.
Giles, 68 Me.
The official bond required of a collector of taxes must be a sealed
instrument : id.
The words "witness our hands and seals," when no seal is attached,
will not make the instrument, though otherwise in proper form, a bond:
Id.
An instrument, in form a bond, but containing no seal, voluntarily
executed and delivered in lieu of a bond and accepted therefor, is valid:
and its acceptance is a sufficient consideration to cover all official delinquencies in not paying over money actually collected after such acceptauce : Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
See Railroad.
DAMAGES.

Recovery of Prospective-Supportfrom adjacent Land-Right to.In an action for injury to the plaintiff's land and buildings, by removal
of lateral support through mining operations carried on by the defendant
on his own land adjoining, it was found by a referee to whom the amount
of damage was referred that, in addition to existing damage, there would
be future damage to the extent of 150L Held, by MELLOn and MANISTY, JJT. (COCKBURN, C. J., dissenting), that such damage was recoverable in the action : By COCKBURN, C. J,, inasmuch as, according to
Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. C. 503, the damage was the gist of the
action, only the damage actually accrued could be recovered in the action,
and further damage must be recovered when it actually occurred in
a subsequent action. Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Ex. 259, and Backhouse
v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. C. 503, considered: Lamb v. Walker, Law Rep.
3 Q. B. Div.
EASEMENT.
See Damages.
Implied Grant not Favored-Grant by Necessity.-Implied grants
are not to-be favored, .and will not be held to exist except in cases of
clear necessity. Thus, a right of drainage through the grantor's adjoinVoL. XXVI-100
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ing land will not pass by implication (the deed being silent upon the
subject), unless such right is clearly necessary to the beneficial enjoyment
of the estate conveyed, though a drain has already been constructed
through the adjoining land, and is in use at the time of the conveyance.
Doll" ct al. v. Boston and Mane Railroad, 68 Me.
EVIDENCE.

Subscription in Aid of Railroad-Evidence of Original Proposal to
Biild.-ln an action upon an instrument referring to a proposal to build
a railroad, between two specified points, and binding the signers to give
their notes in aid thereof, evidence of what the proposition was is admissible, since the instrument must have been signed in view of it, in the
absence of the articles of association (no company having yet been organized at the time of subscription), which might have definitely fixed
the line of the road and concluded the parties: The Detroit L. and L.
. Railroad Co. v. Starnes. S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
Since an agreement to build a railroad, between two points, ordinarily
leaves a choice of routes open, and since parties may -ubscribe solely in
view of thb adoption of some particular route, the location of a large body
of water or other practically insurmountable obstacle may be shown as a
reason why the contemplated road was not intended to start at a particular point and run in a particular direction, but was designed to use for
some distance the track of a previously constructed road: id.
Res gestm.-The plaintiff was assaulted and-injured'by the defendant
while interfering to protect her father in an affray between them. Held
that, while the fact of the affray and an injury to her father may have
been admissible in evidence, the detailed account of its subsequent consequence would not be : Flint v. Breck, 68 Me.
FENCE.
HIGwAY.

See Negligence.
See Negligence.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Separation-Authority to pledge Husband's Credit.-Where husband
-and wife separate by mutual consent, the wife making her own terms as
to her income, and that income proves insufficient for her support, the
wife has no authority to pledge her husband's credit. Defendants.
husband and wife, executed a deed of separation, by the terms of which
the wife retained the income of property settled to her separate use on
marriage. The husband covenanted to pay her 201. a year towards the
maintenance of three of the children of the marriage, and the wife covenanted to maintain these children until they were twenty-one, and not
to apply for further assistahce to her husband. The husband had kept
up the annual payments of 201., in accordance with the terms of the
deed. Plaintiff sued defendants in the county court to recover the price
of meat supplied to the wife after the separation, and the judge at the
trial, on hearing the wife's evidence; found that her income was insufficient for her support, and ruled that she had authority to pledge her
husband's credit for the price of the meat. On appeal: Held, that this
ruling was wrong, and that the wife after the separation had no implied
authority to pledge her husband's credit: Eastland v. Burchell, Law
Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
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JUDGMENT.

Cannot be rendered against one out of the Jurisdiction of the Court.-

No judgment can be rendered *againsta man who is not brought within
the jurisdiction of the court, because somebody else is on a similar liability: Godfrey et al. v. Terry, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
LIBEL.

Privileged Communication-JMtalice in Fact-Evilence of Express

MAfalice.-In an action for libel where the occasion is privileged, it is for
the plaintiff to establish that the statements complained of were made
from an indirect motive, such as anger or with a knowledge that they
were untrue, or without caring whether they were true or false and not
for the reason which would otherwise render them privileged; and if
the defendant made- the statements believing them to be true, he will
not lose the protection arising from the privileged occasion, although
he had no reasonable grounds for his belief: Clark v. .. olyneux, Law
Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
LIEN.

Parties.-Theexistence of a lien
for repairs cannot be raised by third persons who have levied upon the
chattel subject to the lien, as an objection to replevin by the party claiming ownership and who ordered the repairs: Bodine v. Simmons, S. C.
Mich., April Term 1878.
For Repairs not available by Third

LIs PENDENs.

See Xuniclpal Corporation.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

-"

Negligence of Servant-Liability of .Aaster.-The servant of the
occupants of an upper tenement accidentally left open a faucet, thereby
causing the water to overflow and flood the tenement below. Reld, that
the occupants of the upper tenement were liable for the damage thereby
done: Simonton et al. v. Loring et al., 68 Me.
MIORTGAGE.

Writ of .Ent2y by Afortgagor-Judgment on CollateralNotes not Sat-

isfaction.-The mortgagor cannot maintain a writ of entry against the
mortgagee, or his assignees, without showing a satisfaction of the mortgage.

Jewett v. Hamlin, 68 Me.

Suing.the notes secured by a mortgage, and procuring judgment upon
them, without satisfaction, in no way affects the validity of the mortgage:
Awri of entry by the mortgagor, against the mor

e

temrgagee or his asAetr
ri ob te orgaor ans
signee, is not an appropriate action in which to determine the validity
of an attempted foreclosure: Id.
Grantee'sLiability to Mortgagee.-Thegrantee of mortgaged premises

is not liable at law to a mortgagee upon his covenant with the mortgagor
to pay the mortgage debt: Hicks v. fcGar2y, S. C. Mich., April Term
1878.
Mortgagee with Notice.-A mortgagee with notice of the fraudulent
discharge of a prior mortgage is not a bonafide purchaser: Connecticut
GeneralLife Ins. Co. v. Burnstine, S. C. U. S., October Term 1877.
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Absolute Convegance-Admnissibity of.-In equity parol testimony is
admissible to show that a conveyauee absolute on its flice was in fact a
mortgage: Risher v. Smith, S. U. U. S., October Term 1877.
Mortgagee in lPossessioa Covenants- Costs.-The fact that a mortgagce in possession first conveyed the land with a covenant against
encumbrances, and then took the mortgage, under which he holds possession, as security for a portion of the purchase-money, will not render
him chargeable with rent, or for damages equal to rent, fbr a period of time
during which a third party held possession of the land without right and
without the consent, of the mortgagee, such possession not constituting an
encumbrance within the meaning of the law, or a breach of the covenant
against encumbrances : Dinsmore v. Savage et al., 68 'e.
When a mortgagee has upon demand rendered a true account of the
amount due upon the mortgage, a bill in equity to redeem cannot be
maintained, unless the plaintiff first tenders to the mortgagee the amount
due or is prevented from so doing through the fault of the mortgagee:
id.
If the plaintiff prevails in a suit in equity to redeem land under
mortgage, he recovers costs as a legal right, the law in this respect
having been changed since the decision in'Bourne v. Littlefield, 29
Me. 302-: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Bonds issued by-Bona fide lolder-Lis Pendens.-If a municipal
body has lawful power to issue bonds or other negotiable securities,
dependent only upon the adoption.of certain preliminary proceedings,
such as a popular election of the constitutional body, the holder in good
faith has a right to assume that such preliminary proceedings have taken
place, if the fhct be certified on the fhce of the bonds themselves, by the
authorities whose primary duty it is to ascertain it: County, of Warren
v. Maircy et al., S. C. U. S., October Term 1877.
It is a general iule that all persons dealing with property are bound
to take notice of a suit pending with regard to the title thereof, and
will, on their peril, purchase the same from any of the parties to the
suit. But this rule is not of universal application. It does not apply
to negotiable securities purchased before maturity, nor to articles of
ordinary commerce sold in the usual way: .d
NEGLIGENCE.

See

Mtisance.

lmiiury to Cattle from Defective and Improper Fencing-Landlord
and Tenant.-The plaintiff and the defendants respectively occupied
adjoining lands as tenants under the same landlord. By the terms of
their lease, the defendants were bound to fence the land in their occupation for the benefit of the lessor and his tenants. About twenty years
ago the predecessors of the defendants had fenced their land with wire
rope, and the defendants allowed this fence to remain, and from time to
time partially repaired it. From long exposure, the strands of the
wires composing the rope decayed, and pieces of it fell to the ground
and lay hidden in the grass of the adjoining pasture occupied by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's cow in grazing there, swallowed one of these
pieces and died in consequence : Held, that the defendants were liable
to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the cow : Firth v. The Bowling Iron Co., Law Rep. 3 C. P. Div.
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Dangerous Instruzment in Road-Proximate Cause of Injury-Intervening Act of third Party-Renotenessof Damage.-Thedefendant, who
was in the occupation of certain premises abutting on a private road consisting of a carriage and footway, which premises he used for the purpose of athletic sports, had erected a barrier across the road to prevent
persons driviug vehicles up to the fence surrounding his premises and
,overlooking the sports. In the middle of this barrier was a gap which
.vas usually open for the passage of vehicles, but which, when the sports
.vere going on, was closed by means of a pole let down across it. It was
.dmitted that the defendant had no legal right to erect this barrier.
Some person, without the defendant's authority, removed a part of the
barrier armed with spikes, commonly balled chievaux de frise, from the
carriageway where the defendant had placed it and put it in an upright
position across the footpath. The plaintiff, on a dark night, was lawfully
passing along the road on his way from one of the houses to which it
led. He felt his way through the opening in the middle of the barrier
and getting on to the fbotpath was proceeding along it when his eye
came in contact with on of the spikes of the clievaux de frise and was
injured. It was not suggested that the plaintiff was guilty of .any negligence contributing to the accident, and the jury found that the use of
the chevaux de frise in the road was dangerous to the safety of the persons using it: Held, that the defendant, having unlawfully placed a dangerous instrument in the road, was liable in respect of injuries occasioned
by it to the plaintiff, who was lawfully using the road, notwithstanding
the fact that the immediate cause of the accident was the intervening act
of a third party in removing the dangerous instrument from the carriageway, where the defendant had placed it, to the footpath. Aangan V.
Atterton, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 239, discussed: Clark v. Chambers,Law Rep.

3 Q. B. Div.
NUISANCE.

Injury caused to an A(Yoinhng Occupier- Water, Percolation ofi-A
statement of claim alleged that the surface of the defendants' land had
been artificially raised by earth placed thereon, and that in consequence
rain-water falling on the defendants' land made its way through the defendants', wall into the adjoining house of the plaintiff, and caused substantal damage. Held, upon demurrer, that the statement of claim
disclosed a good cause of action: Hurdman v. The North Eastern Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 0. P. Div. (Ct. App.).
PARTNERSHIP.

Euity-Death of Partner-Dissolution.-Unless
articles of partnership contain some special provision fbr.further continuance, a partner's
death dissolves the firm, and leaves its settlement in the survivor's hands;
and a court of equity has no power to enforce a partnership agreement
after such dissolution of the firm by the partner's death : Roberts v.
.elsey, S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
Assent of Co-partnerspresumed.-Where an agent of a firm, with the
assent of one partner, assigned a demand due tile firm, to apply on a
debt against himself and the assenting partner, teld, that the person
owing the demand could not contest the validity of the assignment with-
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out producing evidence that the other partners did not acquiesce in the
transter: Kithl et al. v. Thohip.mon ct (t., S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
Set o agaist A.synre !/* Clahn.-An indebtedness to be available
as set-off against the assignee of a demand, must have accrued before the
assignment : d.
PATENT.

Rigits secured b -- What constutes d;fference of Device.-Rights
secured to an inventor by letters patent are property which consists in
the exclusive privilege of making and using the invention and of vending
the same to others to be used for the period prescribed by the patent
act, and the provision is that every patent and any interest therein shall
be assignable in law by an instrument in writing: Pafier-bag Machine
Co. et al. v. 1ophy et al., S 0. U. S., October Term 1877.
Devices in a patented machine are different in the sense of the patent
law when they perform different functions or in a different way, or produce a substantially different result: 1W.
The substantial equivalent of' a thing in the sense of the patent law is
the same as the thing itself, so that if two devices do the same work in
substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same result
they are the same even though they differ in name, form or shape : Id.
Retress of JBatentee-Reissneof J'dtent.-Owners of a patent, whether
patentees or assignees may seek redress for the unlawful use of the improvement which it secures, in the Circuit Court, by a suit at law or in
equity, at their option, but in either form of proceeding they must allege
and prove that they or those under whom they claim are the original and
first inventors of the improvement, and that the opposite party or- parties have infringed their exclusive right to make or use the same or
vend it to others to be used. Both allegations must be proved, but the
letters-patent, if introduced and in due form, afford a rina facie presumption that the -first allegation is true, which casts the burden of proof
upon the defending party: Marsh-et al. v. Seymour et al., S. C. U. S.,
October Term 1877.
Patents when inoperative or invalid, may in certain cases be surrendered and re-issued, but the new patent in such case must be for the
same invention as the original patent, and if it is for a different invention
the re-issue is invalid, for the reason that it was granted without authority of law : R.
Infringers, if they give due notice of such a defence, may show that,
the patentee is not the original and first inventor of the improvement,
and if they establish that allegation the prosecuting party is not entitled
to recover, but the burden to the defence if the patent is introduced in
evidence, is cast upon the defending party to prove the affirmative of
the issue: R.
PAYMENT.

P'ayment a question of Fct.-Vhether certain facts make out an understanding between parties, that a particular transaction shall settle a
demand is not a question of law: Sly v. Freeman, S. C. Mich., April
Term 1878.
PLEADING.

See Action.
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RAILROAD.

Passenger's Luggage-Delivcry to Passenger- Termination of Companyi's Ris.-It
is the duty of a railway company with regard to the
luggage of a passenger, which travels by the same train with him but
not under his control, when it has reached its destination, to have it
ready for delivery upon the platform at the usual place of delivery until
the owner, in the exercise of due diligence, can receive it; and the
liability of the company does not cease until a reasonable time has been
allowed to the owner to do so : Patscheiderv. The Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Ex. Div.
Common Carriers-Passenger'sLiggageplaced in Compartment with
inm-Meglgence.-A railway company are not insurers in respect of
luggage placed at a passenger's request in the same compartment in
which he intends to travel; and they will not be liable to compensate
him if luggage so placed is lost or stolen without any negligence on their
part: Bergheim v. Great Eastern Railway Conyany, Law Rep. 0. P).
Div.
REPLFEVIN.

See Lien.

SIL-E.

False Representation-Contagious Disease, Animals affected withSale in lfarket-Implied Representationthat Animals not suffering from
Disease.-T he defendant sent for sale to a public market, pigs which he
knew to be infected with a contagious disease; they were exposed for
sale, subject to a condition that no warranty would be given and no
compensation would be made in respect of any fault. No verbal representation was made by or on behalf of the defendant as to the condition of the pigs. The plaintiff having bought the pigs, put them with
other pigs, which became infected; some of the pigs bought from the
defendant and also some of those with which they were put, died of the
contagious disease. The plaintiff having sued to recover damages for
the loss which he had sustained: Held, that the defendant was not
liable to the plaintiff, for that his conduct in exposing the pigs for
sale in the market did not amount to a representation that they were
free from disease: Ward v. Hobbs, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div. (Ct. App.)
Of Goods-Passingof Property in-Bill of Lading, Goods delivered
to Order,.-P.shipped six hundred tons of umber upon a vessel chartered
,,for the plaintiff. The bills of lading made the umber deliverable to the
or'er of P. or assigns. The plaintiff insured the umber. A bill of exchange drawn by P. on the plaintiff which had been discounted by the
defendant's bank, to whom the bills of lading had been transferred, having been refused acceptance, a second bill was drawn by P. to the order
of C. on the plaintiff, and was given to the defendants in exchange for
the first bill, upon the terms that the plaintiff should accept and pay the
second bill against the delivery of the bill of lading. The umber and
the bill of exchange reached their destination at the same time, but the
plaintiff declined to accept the bill. The umber was, therefore, entered
at the custom house in the defendant's name. Subsequently the plaintiff
tendered the amonnt of the bill of exchange and demanded the bill of
lading, but the defendants refused to give up the bill of lading; the
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plaintiff offered a guarantee for the freight, which offer was not accepted
by the defendauts, and they sold the cargo. ield, in an action by the
plaintiff for the value of the umber so sold by the defendants, that the
property in the umber passed to the plaintiff, and that, therefore, the
pl:intiff was entitled to recover : Ifirabita v. Imperial Ottomau Bank,
Law tep. 3 Exch. Div.
SALVAGE.

See Admiralty.

SHIPPING.

('harter-party-Desritionof T-esscl- Warranty.-A description in
a charter-party that a vessel is of a particular class is not a continuing
warranty, but applies only to the classification at the time the charterparty is made: Hurst v. Usborne, 18 Q. B. 144, approved of: French
v. Xeicgass, Law Rep. 3 C. P. Div.
Chiarter.1)arty, Construction of-De.p)atch Mloney for 7me saved in
loading and discharging (Cargo.-A charter-party contained the following clause: "Demurrage, if any, at the rate of 20s. per hour, except
in ease of any hands striking work, frosts or floods, revolution or wars,
which may hinder the loading or discharge of the vessel. Despatch
money 10s. per- hour on any time saved in loading or for discharging."
Four days were saved in loading and five days in discharging cargo, making together nine days, which if calculated at twenty-four hours a day
would make 216 hours, or at twelve hours a day 108 hours: field,
that "despatch money" was payable under the charter-party at the rate
of 10s. per hour per day of twenty-four hours: Laing v. .Hollway,
Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
TRtAL.
Agent-Fraudulent Use of Principal's Propertyto Pay his own Debt.
-If the owner of an article of personal property delivers it to another
to sell, the latter has no right to deliver it to his creditor in payment of
his own pre-existing debt; and if he does so, the owner may maintain
trover against the creditor without a previous demand: Rodick v.
C'oburn, 68 Me.
TROVER.

When a Case may be withheld from Jury.-Although there may be
some evidence in favor of a party, yet if it is insuffiient to sustain a verdict, so that one based thereon would be set aside, the court is not bound.
to submit the case to the jury, but may direct them what verdict to render : Herbert v. Butler, S.,(. U. S. Oct. Term 1877.
WATER. See Nuisance.

